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Hall v. City of Santa Barbara: The "Taking" of 
Property Through Rent Control 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Property owners have frequently challenged rent control laws as 
unconstitutional "takings" of private property. However, these and 
other constitutional challenges have generally been unsuccessful. Rely-
ing on the broad police powers accorded to the states, courts have usu-
ally found rent control statutes to be constitutionally sound.1 In August 
1986, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hall v. City of 
Santa Barbara, 2 questioned the constitutional validity of a Santa Bar-
bara, California rent control statute applicable to mobile home parks. 
The case arose when owners of a mobile home park brought action 
against the City of Santa Barbara seeking compensation for an alleged 
"taking" of property resulting from the operation of the city's mobile 
home rent control ordinance. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance gave 
mobile home tenants a permanent possessory interest in the land on 
which the mobile homes were located. The United States District Court 
for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that if the dis-
puted facts were subsequently shown to be as plaintiffs alleged, the rent 
control ordinance should be held to transfer a possessory interest in 
plaintiffs' land to the mobile home tenants.3 The Ninth Circuit held 
that plaintiffs' allegations constituted a valid claim and instructed the 
lower court to address the question whether the alleged transfer of a 
possessory interest amounted to an uncompensated "taking" of private 
property prohibited by the fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution!This note explains and analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision 
1. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986)(holding that the rent control staute 
was not per se unconstitutional and violative of the fifth amendment); Fresh Pond Shopping 
Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983)(dismissing an appeal of a ruling upholding the rent 
control statute); Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346, cert. denied. 340 U.S. 876 (1950)(holding 
that the rent control statute involved was not a taking of property without compensation); Woods 
v. Cloyd W. Miller, Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948)(holding that the rent control statute involved did 
not violate equal protection); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944)(holding that the rent 
control statute involved did not violate due process); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 
U.S. 170 (1920)(holding that the rent control statute involved was not an impairment of contract 
rights). 
2. 797 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1986)(on appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim). 
3. Jd. at 1502. 
4. Id. at 1498. 
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in Hall and demonstrates that the court's "takings" analysis was in-
complete. Although the court correctly focused on one aspect of "tak-
ings" analysis, it unduly prejudiced plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim 
by failing to properly address other pleaded theories which might have 
proven dispositive of the "takings" question at trial. 
II. THE Hall CASE 
In August of 1984, the City of Santa Barbara enacted a rent con-
trol ordinance applicable to mobile home parks. The ordinance set forth 
certain requirements for mobile homes.C1 Lot owners were required to 
give tenants unlimited duration leases: leases terminable at will by the 
tenants but terminable only for cause by the owners.6 In addition, rent 
increase maximums were established, both as to frequency and 
amount. 7 
Williams and Jean Hall, owners of a mobile home park,8 brought 
suit against the City of Santa Barbara under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 claim-
ing that the city's mobile home rent control ordinance effected a "tak-
ing" of their property without just compensation in violation of the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments. 10 The Halls asserted that the ordinance 
effected a "taking" in two ways. First, they claimed that the application 
of the ordinance severely diminished the value and usefulness of their 
property. Second, they claimed that the ordinance forced a perpetual 
lease on their property at a below-market rental rate and alleged that 
this action transferred a possessory interest to the tenants, an interest 
with both a determinable market value and a ready market.11 
The Halls intended to prove at trial that mobile homes in their 
5. /d. at 1495-96. 
6. The Ninth Circuit noted that although the ordinance did not explicitly state that the lease 
was terminable at will by the tenants, the ordinance implicitly so stated, and it was treated termi-
nable at will by both parties. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1495-96 n.l. 
7. Id. at 1496. 
8. Williams and Jean Hall (Plaintiffs) are residents of the City of Santa Barbara and own 
the Los Amigos Mobile Home Estates which is located within the City of Santa Barbara. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states, "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. . . . " 
10. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1496. 
II. Although the Halls did not actually divide their complaint into these two separate "tak-
ings" theories, their brief did contain elements of both. (Appellant's Opening Brief, Hall, 797 
F.2d at 1493.) As is pointed out later in this note, these "taking" theories are separate and dis-
tinct. The Halls would have better stated their argument had they specifically identified the two 
theories and made clear arguments for both. 
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park were selling for as much as ten times the California mobile home 
blue book value12 because of the favorable regulated lot rent where the 
mobile homes were located.13 The value of the possessory interest trans-
ferred from the Halls to the mobile home tenants was alleged to be the 
difference between a mobile home's blue book value and its selling 
price. 14 
The Hall's two grounds for relief were in effect a single claim of 
inverse condemnation - a cause of action against a government agency 
to recover the value of property lost through agency regulation or ac-
tion, though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has 
been completed. 111 Because the Halls were appealing the district court's 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Ninth Circuit only addressed 
the question whether the trial court had properly dismissed the inverse 
condemnation claim.16 Overruling the district court's dismissal, the cir-
cuit court held that, on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, application of 
the Santa Barbara ordinance might constitute a "taking."17 
In reaching its decision to remand the case, the Ninth Circuit 
identified two lines of Supreme Court cases addressing inverse condem-
nation claims.18 In the first line of authority, the cases address regula-
tory actions claimed to have diminished the value or usefulness of pri-
vate property but not involving any physical occupation or physical 
invasion. Actions by government in this area are often called "regula-
tory takings."~9 In the second line of authority, the cases address gov-
12. The blue book spoken of is the KELLEY BLUE BooK FOR MANUFACTURED HoUSING 
(Mobile Homes), published by the Kelley Blue Book company of Costa Mesa, California. It is a 
standard reference for prices of mobile homes. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1496 n.S. 
13. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Hall, 797 F.2d at 1493. 
14. See id. at 21. 
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979). 
16. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1496 nn.8, 9 (the court stated that a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim is a question of law; therefore, the court could have reviewed the case de novo. Guillory v. 
County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) However, the Hall court did not actually 
perform a de novo review, choosing instead to focus on one aspect of the case. 
17. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1504. 
18. /d. at 1497. The Ninth Circuit did note that three questions had to be answered before it 
could find whether the Santa Barbara rent control ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional 
taking. The three questions were: I) Did the governmental action amount to a taking of prop-
erty?; 2) Did it advance a legitimate state interest?; and 3) Was there just compensation?. Al-
though the court briefly addressed the last two questions, it devoted most of its opinion to the 
"taking" question. 
19. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)(regulatory 
taking occurs if a regulation denies the owner of practically all use of his land); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980) (no regulatory taking occurs where the property can be used 
profitably after the implementation of a regulation, even though the use isn't the most profitable); 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)(no regulatory taking 
where a regulation denies the most beneficial use of the property); United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256 (J946)(regulatory taking found when planes from a neighboring airport, leased by the 
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ernment action which physically intrudes upon private property either 
directly or by authorizing others to do so. The court described this type 
of action as "physical occupation."20 
The plaintiff landowners' "takings" argument in Hall was one of 
first impression for the Ninth Circuit.21 For the first time, a rent con-
trol statute was said to have not only regulated the use of an owner's 
land but also to have effected a physical occupation of the land.22 The 
Halls argued that they were forced to give possession of their land to 
the tenants and that this governmentally mandated transfer of a posses-
sory interest constituted a "taking" without "just compensation."23 The 
City of Santa Barbara responded that the ordinance was a mere land 
use regulation imposing a statutory lease which protected mobile home 
lot tenants. The City argued that the ordinance did not transfer a pos-
sessory interest to the tenant and was not an unconstitutional 
"taking. "24 
Rejecting the City's argument, the Ninth Circuit noted that if the 
facts alleged by the Halls were proven true, enforcement of the Santa 
Barbara ordinance would in fact result in a permanent physical occu-
pation of the property by the mobile home tenants.211 The court rea-
soned that since the rent control ordinance required leases of unlimited 
duration and terminable at will only by tenants, property owners were 
left with only a narrow right to repossess their property.26 If tenants 
honored their contracts with the property owner and continued paying 
military on a temporary basis, passed over private property so low that they destroyed a chicken 
farm); Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879)(a "taking" was found when a 
city constructed a temporary dam in a river which flooded land prohibiting entry onto private 
property). 
20. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)(permanent 
physical occupation was found when a city authorized a cable television company to install cable 
boxes on privately owned apartment buildings); Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (a 
"taking" was found when the government created a public right of access to a private marina); 
Pummpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872)((a "taking" was found when a state 
has authorized a dam to be built that floods privately owned land). 
21. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1496. 
22. /d. 
23. /d. 
24. See id. at 1499-1501. 
25. /d. at 1502. 
26. See id. at 1495-96 n.2. The rent control ordinance allowed a landlord to terminate a 
lease for the following causes: "(1) failure to comply with a local or state mobile home regulation; 
(2) conduct that constitutes substantial annoyance to other resident; (3) failure to comply with 
lease provisions or reasonable park rules; ( 4) non-payment of rent, utility charges, or reasonable 
service charges; (5) condemnation of the park; (6) change in the park in accordance with Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 798.56(f); and (7) cessation of occupancy by the tenant." /d. Each one of 
the seven causes for termination were largely out of the property owner's control. 
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rent, the property owner had little possibility to terminate the lease.27 
Additionally, tenants could transfer their mobile homes without inter-
rupting the unlimited duration lease term.28 Thus, the Santa Barbara 
ordinance gave old tenants the exclusive right to choose new tenants, 
denying the landowners this traditional right of fee ownership. The 
only right the property owners retained was the right to collect forcibly 
reduced rents.29 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that, according to plaintiffs' allega-
tions, enforcement of the statute permitted tenants to derive an eco-
nomic benefit from the leases by causing mobile home prices to rise 
above blue book values. Buyers were willing to pay more for the mobile 
homes because of the desirability to live in a rent control area.30 In 
effect, the tenant received a possessory interest and an economic inter-
est in the land at the property owner's expense. The interest could be 
transferred, had a market value, and could be sold at a profit. The 
court described the ability to sell the possessory interest at a profit as a 
"monetization" of the interest. 31 This ability to monetize the possessory 
interest, the court emphasized, would be determinative of the takings 
question should the plaintiffs' factual allegations be established at 
trial. 32 The court used this monetization factor to distinguish the Hall 
case from earlier rent control cases which had held that rent control 
statutes were valid exercises of police power.33 
27. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1500. 
28. Tenants could sell their mobile homes at a higher price than the blue book value because 
of the favorable lot lease involved. The lot lease, with its reduced rents, would be assigned to the 
new tenant when the mobile home was purchased. This situation is what the Ninth Circuit refers 
to as reaping a monetary windfall, or "monetizing" of the possessory interest. Hall, 797 F.2d at 
1501-02. 
29. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1502. 
30. See supra note 12. An argument may be made that any mobile home price increase was 
merely a reflection of some external factor (e.g. inflation, appreciation or the mobile home, or the 
unique housing situation in Santa Barbara) that caused a general real estate price increase in the 
area. However, this theory's value is diminished because at least one instance exists where mobile 
home prices in another community with a similar mobile home rent control ordinance rose sub-
stantially above blue book value when the ordinance was passed. Amicus Curiae Brief of Oak 
Forest Mobile Home Estates, Ltd. at 4; Hall, 797 F.2d at 1493. 
31. The Halls were willing to prove at trial that, for example, when Tenant #1 sold her 
mobile home for $50,000.00 in excess of its blue book value, she effectively added an additional 
$500.00 per month to Tenant #2's total cost of occupying the mobile home. This $500.00 was in 
addition to the $200.00 monthly rent for a mobile home park lot. Tenant #2, in turn, would 
recapture this additional cost per month when he later sold the mobile home to Tenant #3. 
Therefore, Tenant #I would be the only person that actually was unjustly enriched. Tenant #I 
freely received a possessory interest at the expense of the Halls, and she was able to sell that 
interest to Tenant #2 by raising the price of the mobile home. This results in the "monetization" 
of the possessory interest. 
32. See Hall, 797 F.2d at 1501. 
33. !d. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
As noted, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Hall from other rent 
control cases based on the allegation that the mobile home tenants in 
Hall could "monetize" the possessory interest they had received from 
the property owner. It was largely on the strength of this argument that 
the appellate court instructed the lower court to try the merits of the 
plaintiffs' "takings" claim.3" However, the monetization argument was 
not the only theory which plaintiffs used to challenge the rent control 
ordinance. The appellate court failed to consider two other theories 
which were implicit in the Halls' complaint. 311 These two theories can 
be stated as follows: 1) a governmentally mandated "perpetual lease" 
can itself constitute a physical occupation of property, even in the ab-
sence of a finding of "monetization"; and 2) the facts alleged by the 
Halls' supported a "takings" claim even under pure regulatory taking 
analysis. By failing to properly address these alternative theories, the 
circuit court prejudiced the plaintiffs' chances for a complete review of 
their claim at trial. 
A. The "Perpetual Lease" 
At one point in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that "if the 
Halls' allegations were proven true, it would be difficult to say that the 
[rent control] ordinance [did] not transfer an interest in their land to 
others."38 This transfer, the court went on to say, would be the 
equivalent of a permanent physical occupation of property, an action 
which the Supreme Court has held to be a per se "taking" of private 
property by government. 37 In reaching this conclusion, the court fo-
cused heavily on the plaintiffs' claim that the mobile home tenants 
could sell their governmentally created property interests to third par-
ties. This fact, the court noted, "drastically affects the economic realities 
of the landlord/tenant relationship."38 The court felt that the tenants' 
ability to "monetize" their interests in the property marked a "crucial" 
distinction between the Santa Barbara ordinance and other rent control 
ordinances which denied tenants the right to "cash out."39 
While the court is not to be faulted for making this distinction, it 
unduly limited its analysis by focusing solely on the saleability of the 
tenants' interests. Even had the mobile home tenants in Hall not been 
34. ld. 
35. Supra note II. 
36. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1499. 
37. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27, 433 (1982). 
38. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1501. 
39. ld. 
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able to profit from the sale of their possessory interests, the fact remains 
that they had received permanent occupancy of the mobile home lot at 
the property owners' expense. The ordinance, by leaving property own-
ers with very limited rights to exclude tenants from occupancy of the 
property, granted tenants a perpetual lease on the property.40 The right 
to exclude is one of the fundamental rights associated with ownership 
of property_"! 
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 42 the Supreme Court addressed 
the question whether the conversion of a private marina into a public 
aquatic park constituted a "taking." The Court noted that "the right to 
exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental element of the prop-
erty right, falls within this category of interests that the government 
cannot take without compensation."43 The Court went on to hold that 
the denial of the right to exclude results in an actual physical invasion 
of the privately owned property."" 
In Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea, 411 a case similar to Hall, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals also dealt with the concept of a property 
owner's right to exclude. In Rivera, a rent control statute covering bus-
iness, commercial and industrial property gave the tenant a perpetual 
lease which the property owner could terminate for only very limited 
reasons."6 Rivera wanted to terminate the lease on a building he owned 
so that he could use the building space for his own purposes."7 The 
trial court held that the statute was constitutional and dismissed Ri-
vera's action of unlawful detainer noting that terminating a lease to 
return property for personal use was not one of the statutorily allowed 
reasons for termination.'8 On appeal, the First Circuit held the statute 
unconstitutional saying, "for the legislature to compel [Rivera] against 
his will to keep his property in the rental market and to prevent him 
from using it in his own personal business ... would appear to be a 
'taking' of the property for which just compensation has not been 
provided. "49 
40. The Halls argued that the transferred possessory interest should be termed a life estate. 
However, the potential impact of the Santa Barbara ordinance was not limited to lifetime leases. 
Nothing prevented tenants from assigning their leases to later tenants, who might live longer than 
the original tenants. This does not constitute a life estate but is analogous to a perpetual lease. 
41. Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1 979). 
42. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
43. !d. at 179-80. 
44. See id. at 1 80. 
45. 181 F.2d 974 (1st Cir. 1950). 
46. !d. at 976. 
47. See id. at 975. 
48. ld. at 975-76. 
49. !d. at 978. 
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Like the building owner in Rivera, the Halls could not exclude 
tenants in occupation except for very limited causes over which they 
had little or no control. 110 The Halls were virtually forced to keep their 
property in the rental market,111 and this condition gave the tenants of 
the mobile home park the equivalent of a perpetual lease. Recognizing 
this dilemma, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
[C]ertain features of the Santa Barbara ordinance, and the way it 
is alleged to operate, make it peculiarly susceptible to the claim 
presented by the Halls. Thus, the ordinance directs the landlord to 
give tenants a lease, a recognized estate in land, lasting indefinitely. 
Moreover, the landlord's residual rights in the property are largely at 
the mercy of his tenants, he loses practically all right to decide who 
occupies the property, and on what terms}12 
The court failed to extend this analysis, however, to determine 
whether a governmentally mandated perpetual lease, which denies 
property owners the right to exclude, is a compensable "taking" of pri-
vate property. By focusing solely on the mobile home tenants' right to 
monetize their possessory interest, the court overlooked a less burden-
some and equally viable theory of recovery implicit in the original 
complaint. 
B. Regulatory Taking Analysis 
The terms "physical occupation" and "regulatory taking" re-
present distinct categories of governmental action. Claims challenging 
each type of action are addressed by different lines of authority.113 
While early in its opinion the Ninth Circuit was careful to separate the 
two types of claims, it later uses analysis reserved for regulatory taking 
inquiry to describe a physical occupation. Near the end of its takings 
analysis, the court observed that, as alleged, the Santa Barbara ordi-
nance gave practically all property rights to the tenants, leaving the 
50. Supra note 26. 
51. The Halls were virtually forced to keep their property in the rental market because of 
the considerable obstacles one must overcome before going out of the mobile home park business. 
The Ninth Circuit stated, "State law allows the mobile park owner to evict tenants in order to put 
the park to a different use only upon giving six months' notice; such notice may only be given after 
all necessary local permits have been obtained. Cal. Civil Code §798.56(f). Santa Barbara in turn 
requires that a mobile home park owner obtain a permit to convert a park to another use. Santa 
Barbara, Cal. Municipal Code ch. 28.78.010 (1984). An applicant for such a permit must file a 
plan outlining the use to which the property is to be put, describing the impact of the removal on 
displaced residents, and disclosing the relocation assistance to be provided. /d. ch. 28.78.040. Any 
such plan must be approved by the city's Community Development Department. /d. ch. 
28.78.050." Hall, 797 F.2d at 1500 n.18. 
52. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1498-99. 
53. Supra note 18. 
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landowners with only the minimal right to collect reduced rents. This 
situation, the court concluded, "oversteps the boundries of mere regula-
tion and shades into permanent occupation of the property for which 
compensation is due."M 
This statement sends a subtle message that the Santa Barbara rent 
control ordinance could not, as pure regulation, constitute a taking of 
private property. The court's statement obscures the fact that a com-
pensable taking would likely be found even if pure regulatory taking 
analysis were applied. 1111 
The leading case followed by courts to determine whether an ordi-
nance constitutes a regulatory taking is Penn Central Transportation 
v. New York City. 116 In that case, the Supreme Court stated that regula-
tory takings analysis was "essentially an ad hoc, factual in-
quiry .... " 117 However, the Court identified several factors which are 
significant to this inquiry, two of which have proven particularly im-
portant. These two factors are: 1) the economic impact of the regula-
tion; and 2) the character of the governmental action at issue.118 
1. Economic impact 
Assessing economic impact requires scrutiny of two conditions. 
Courts must look at any interference which governmental regulation 
causes to the distinct investment-backed expectations of the property 
owner.119 In addition, courts must look at the extent to which govern-
ment action has caused private property to decr~ase in value.60 
a. Interference with investment-backed expectations 
A review of the cases which address the question whether a land 
use regulation has interferred with a landlord's investment-backed ex-
pectations does not yield any clear definition of the term "investment-
backed expectations." Nor do the cases reveal how much interference is 
required.61 The only clear rule is that the answer to the question 
54. Hall, 797 F.2d at 1502 (emphasis added). 
55. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
56. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
57. /d. at 124. 
58. ld. 
59. /d. 
60. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
61. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedicts, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. 
Mar. 9, 1987)(No. 85-1092); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 107 S. Ct. 22, 
(1986); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, (1986); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamil-
ton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United 
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whether a regulation has effected a "taking" "depends largely upon the 
particular circumstances of [the] case. "62 
Notwithstanding the absence of any clear-cut definition of the 
phrase "investment-backed expectations" or of any defined levels of in-
terference, it is clear from the facts alleged in Hall that the Santa Bar-
bara ordinance had a serious impact on the landowners' property own-
ership. The Halls were prohibited from occupying their land for 
personal use and were virtually forced to keep it in the rental market at 
greatly depressed rental rates.63 Additionally, the Halls had no control 
over who would live on their property; the tenants alone decided who 
would be their successors in interest.u Essentially, the only rights the 
Halls retained were the rights to collect reduced rents and to sell their 
property.611 Because the Santa Barbara ordinance left the Halls with 
few alternatives and few property rights, it most certainly interfered 
with expectations for the profitable use and development of their land. 
b. Diminution in value 
The ordinance also adversely impacted the value of the Halls' 
property interest. Critical to the determination of how much a property 
has decreased in value is the question of allowable use, i.e., the ques-
tion of what use remains in the property after a particular land use 
regulation has been applied. Knowing the use permitted by an ordi-
nance helps courts determine what value remains in the property. This 
in turn permits a comparison of "the value that has been taken from 
the property with the value that remains,''68 a comparison which is 
essential to the question whether government has taken private 
property. 
After passage of the rent control statute, the Halls enjoyed little 
control over their land. They were basically left with the right to collect 
reduced rents and the right to sell the property.67 Although the circuit 
court did not speculate on the value of the Halls' interest in the prop-
erty in light of these remaining rights, one can readily conclude that 
any value left to the Halls would be minimal when compared to the 
States, 467 U.S. I (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981 ); 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164 
(1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
62. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104. 
63. Supra notes 49-50. 
64. Supra note 28. 
65. Supra note 29. 
66. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedicts, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 
1987)(No. 85-1092). 
67. Supra note 29. 
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value of the interests transferred to the mobile home tenants. Addition-
ally, because the Halls lost the right to occupy their land for personal 
use and to determine who would succeed existing tenants, their interest 
in the property was clearly much less attractive to prospective buyers. 
This disincentive to purchasers (a detriment to remaining use) was cer-
tain to have had a negative effect on the Halls' remaining value in the 
property. 
2. Character of the governmental action 
In Penn Central it was noted that the character of the governmen-
tal action alleged to have taken private property is significant.68 The 
Court stated that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion 
by government, than when interference arises from some public pro-
gram adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good."69 In other words, a regulatory taking is more readily 
found when government has physically invaded private property. 
Although courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Hall, often use 
the terms "physical occupation" and "physical invasion" interchangea-
bly, the Supreme Court has described the term "physical invasion" as 
something "short of' a permanent physical occupation.70 In fact, the 
Court has held that any permanent physical occupation is a "taking" 
while a phsical invasion is subject to a balancing process.71 Neverthe-
less, the Court has also stated that "a physical invasion is a government 
intrusion of unusually serious character."'2 
In Hall, the Ninth Circuit completely focused its opinion on a 
determination of permanent physical occupation.73 However, the im-
pact of the Santa Barbara ordinance could have been characterized as a 
physical invasion if on remand the trial court had not found the more 
intrusive condition of permanent physical occupation. Although the 
state itself had not invaded the property, its action nonetheless allowed 
tenants to remain on the land indefinitely.74 This certainly was "an 
68. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
69. /d. 
70. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-30 (1982). 
71. /d. at 432. 
72. /d. at 433. 
73. Supra note 17. 
74. The Supreme Court has held that there is no difference between a physical invasion by 
government and a physical invasion by a party authorized by government. Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 n.9 (1982). 
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intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full 
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it."75 
Had the Ninth Circuit engaged in even a cursory regulatory tak-
ing analysis it would have discovered that the Santa Barbara ordinance 
had the potential to interfere with the Halls' investment-backed expec-
tations, to diminish the value of their property and to cause physical 
invasion of their land. The circuit court should have coupled its remand 
to the lower court with instructions to apply the Penn Central factors 
to the facts of Hall. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Hall unnecessarily limited its analysis of the 
inverse condemnation claim by focusing solely on the "monetization" of 
the possessory interest granted to tenants by the Santa Barbara rent 
control ordinance. By failing to properly address the perpetual lease 
and regulatory taking theories, the circuit court unduly prejudiced the 
Halls' fifth amendment "taking" claim. 
Application of these additional "taking" theories shows that the 
Santa Barbara rent control ordinance granted tenants a perpetual lease 
constituting a transfer of a possessory interest regardless of whether the 
tenants could "monetize" that interest. In addition, the ordinance inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations and diminished the 
value of the Halls' property to such an extent that it amounted to a 
regulatory taking requiring just compensation. The Ninth Circuit 
should have addressed these theories in order to fully consider the 
Halls' fifth amendment "taking" claim. 
Douglas J. Kotarek 
75. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1946). 
